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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DAVID FULLER,

;

Plaintiff/Appellant,

]

vs.

]
)
KRIK MYERS, RAYLYNN SLY,
]
TERESA SUNDAY, DENNIS
;
SUNDAY, BERNHARD MAYER and ;
MAYNA FULLER,
]
Defendants/Appellees.

Case No.200070032-CA

]

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Utah Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant
to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2001 as Amended).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
In addition to the issues raised by the Appellant, the Appellees present the following for the
Court's review.
First, did the Appellant fail to fulfill his duty to marshal the evidence in this case. In
order to successfully challenge a lower court's factual findings, the party "must marshall
[sic] all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts,
and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by
substantial evidence." Grace Drilling Co. v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 776 P.2d 63,
68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); accord Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact finding
1

must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding.").

The

marshaling requirement applies when a party challenges a court's or an agency's factual
findings, regardless of the standard of review at issue. See, e.g., Wilson Supply, Inc. v.
Fradan Mfg. Corp., 54 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2002) (holding that to correctly dispute the lower
court's factual findings as clearly erroneous, "an appellant must first marshal all the evidence
in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to
support the finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below");
United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 140 P.3d 1200 (Utah
2006) ("[P]arties who ask this court to consider fact-sensitive questions-including those
questions reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard-have a duty to marshal all the
evidence that formed the basis for the trial court's ruling."). The marshaling requirement
requires a party to construct the evidence supporting the adversary's position, and then "ferret
out a fatal flaw in the evidence." West Valley Cityv. Majestic Inv. Co., 818P.2dl311,1315
(Utah 1991). Compliance with this undertaking helps ensure that the factual findings of the
agency are overturned only when lacking in substantial evidence. Appellees understand that
the marshaling requirement is not a rule of substantive law but rather it is a tool pursuant to
which the appellate courts impose on the parties an obligation to assist them in conducting
a whole record review. However, parties that fail to marshal the evidence do so at the risk
that the reviewing court will decline, in its discretion, to review the trial court's factual
findings. See Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004) (explaining that the marshaling
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requirement is critical because in its absence the appellate court "must go behind the trial
court's factual findings," which often requires a "colossal commitment of time and resources").
Utah R.App. P. 24(b)(k) ("Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or
stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court...." (emphasis added)).
Second, are the Appellees entitled to an award of double costs and attorney fees,
pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Under Rule 33(b) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, a frivolous appeal"... is one that is not grounded in fact, not
warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law." This Court has stated that "when an appeal is frivolous, ... we will
award fees regardless of the trial court's ruling on fees."i?wr/ v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1171
(Utah Ct.App.1990). However, "[t]he sanction for filing a frivolous appeal applies only in
'egregious cases' with no 'reasonable legal or factual basis.' " Cooke v. Cooke, 22 P.3d 1249
(Utah App. 2001) (citation omitted).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OR STATUTES
Rule 38 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is dispositive of the issue the Appellants
raises with regard to his demand for a jury. The Rule provides as follows:
(a) Right preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by the constitution
or as given by statute shall be preserved to the parties.
(b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right
by a jury by paying the statutory jury fee and serving upon the other parties a
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demand therefor in writing at any time after the commencement of the action
and not later than 10 days after the service of the last pleading directed to such
issue. Such demand may be endorsed upon a pleading of the party.
© Same: specification of issues. In his demand a party may specify the issues
which he wishes so tried; otherwise he shall be deemed to have demanded trial
by jury for all the issues so triable. If he has demanded trial by jury for only
some of the issues, any other party, within 10 days after service of the demand
or such lesser time as the court may order, may serve a demand for trial by jury
of any other or all of the issues of fact in the action.
(d) Waiver. The failure of a party to pay the statutory fee, to serve a demand
as required by this rule and to file it as required by Rule 5(d) constitutes a
waiver by him of trial by jury. A demand for trial by jury made as herein
provided may not be withdrawn without the consent of the parties.
There are no other determinative constitutional provisions, statutes or rules.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellant/Plaintiff included two causes of action in his Complaint. ®. 1-11) The
first cause of action was for malicious prosecution. The Plaintiffs cause of action centered
around the conduct of the Defendant Krik Myers who complained orally and then in a written
report to the Utah County Sheriffs office that the Plaintiff, David Fuller, on October 27,
2003, had grabbed him on the right arm with enough force to leave a bruise and cause him

to lose balance. In addition, as Mr. Myers was pulling away, the Plaintiff, David Fuller told
him that if her ever entered his (Fuller5 s) property, he would prosecute. Id. As background,
the Plaintiff is the father of Jonathan Fuller, who was embroiled in a divorce action with his
wife, Mayna Fuller.

Mr. David Fuller, the Appellant, was attending multiple court

proceedings, in the juvenile and district court, to support his son Jonathan, and to pursue his
own independent legal claims for grandparent visitation with the three minor children born
to Jonathan and Mayna Fuller. (The Plaintiff David Fuller had actually intervened as a party
in the juvenile court action) Id.
The alleged confrontation occurred at an order to show cause hearing on October 27,
I
2003, held in the Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah County. Id.
The Plaintiff, in his Complaint alleged that each of the other Defendants, Bernhard
Mayer, RayLynn Sly (Mayna Fuller's aunt), Teresa Sunday (Mayna Fuller's mother) and
Dennis Sunday (Mayna Fuller's father) had all given statements to police agencies or police
officials substantiating some or all of Krik Myers' account. Id.
The Plaintiffs Complaint continued, alleging that as a result of the statements of the
Defendants, Provo City filed an information charging the Plaintiff, David Fuller, with
disorderly conduct, a Class C Misdemeanor, which information was ultimately dismissed.
Id. The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants initiated the criminal proceedings against the
Plaintiff for an improper purpose. Id.
The Defendants, in their Answers, stood by the statements they had made to

5

government and law enforcement personnel, but denied the remainder of the substantive
allegations of Plaintiff s Complaint and specifically denied that they had initiated criminal
proceedings against the Plaintiff. ®. 12-14, 15-18, 22-23)
Although the Plaintiff had requested a jury in his Complaint ®. 2), no jury fee was
paid when the Complaint was filed on May 19,2004. On October 1,2005, the Plaintiff once
again demanded a jury and tendered a filing fee of $75.00. ®. 193) The trial court denied the
request for a jury trial after oral arguments on November 23,2005. ®. 213,216) The Plaintiff
filed a renewed request for a jury trial on January 20, 2006. ®. 219-227). The Defendants
opposed the motion ®. 228-243) and the Plaintiff submitted a reply memorandum. ®. 235243). The trial court once again denied the Plaintiffs motion for a jury trial on March 7,
2006. ®. 321)
Plaintiff then file a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal on or about March 15, 2006,
which was denied. ®. 324-331).
Judge Taylor conducted a bench trial on March 27, 2006, at the conclusion of which
the trial court found that there was no evidence, absent pure speculation by the court, that the
parties made their various complaints for any other reason other than justice. Further, the
court found that the Plaintiffs had completely failed to provide any evidence of damages
other than asking the trial court to speculate. The trial court found the case to be completely
without merit and ordered the case dismissed. ®. 352-353) A formal order of dismissal was
entered on December 13,2006. ®. 367, Addendum Exhibit "A") The Notice of Appeal was
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filed by the Appellant on January 2, 2007. ®. 374)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Testimony of Sam Banks

At the bench trial conducted by Judge Taylor on March 27, 2006, Sam Banks, a
deputy sheriff for the Utah County Sheriffs office testified. (Tr. 30). He testified that on
October 27,2003, he was working security at the front door of the Fourth District Courthouse
in Provo, Utah. (Tr. 31) Deputy Banks testified that after the alleged encounter, which he did
not witness, he accepted over the next several days, statements made on behalf of both the
Plaintiff and the Defendant Myers. (Tr. 36). The deputy then made a brief statement that he
attached to the packet, indicating that the matter involved a situation at the courthouse that
he did not witness and he submitted it to the Provo City prosecutor's office. Id. The deputy
testified that he recommended a charge of disorderly conduct. ®. 38)
B.

Testimony of Matthew Hilton

Matthew Hilton testified that he was an attorney and in that capacity represented
Jonathan Fuller in the divorce case. He testified that he appeared for Mr. Fuller at the
hearing, where temporary orders were being considered, on October 27,2003, the date of the
altercation between the Plaintiff Fuller and the Defendant Myers. (Tr. 44-45) Mr. Hilton
testified that he waa seated at counsel table when the Plaintiff David fuller and his wife
entered the courtroom. (Tr. 47)
Mr Hilton testified that he observed the Plaintiff David Fuller approach and talk to the
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Defendant Myers, who was seated behind the attorney bar, and tell him that he did not want
him to come on his property anymore and that ". . . he [Plaintiff, David Fuller] was in the
habit of putting one hand on another when he's making a point...." (Tr. 48, 58) Other than
that, Mr. Hilton testified that he did not see any touching or physical contact. (Tr. 49)
However, Mr. Hilton testified that the Plaintiff, Mr. Fuller was upset with the Defendant Krik
Myers and that Mr. Myers got up and moved away from the Plaintiff. (Tr. 58-60).
C.

Testimony of Jonathan Fuller

Jonathan Fuller testified that the Defendant Krik Myers was the person with whom
his wife left, when she separated from him and that his wife and the Defendant Myers spend
a lot of time together and that Myers appears with his wife at a number of the divorce
hearings. (Tr. 71)
Mr. Fuller testified that on October 27,2003, he saw his father tell Defendant Myers
to stay off his property or he would prosecute him for trespassing. He then heard Mr. Myers
respond that ". . . this is not the time or place. . . ." After the statement, Mr. Fuller testified
that everyone then took their seats. (Tr. 71-72)
Mr. Fuller was recalled by the Plaintiffs counsel and testified that Mr. Myers attended
six or seven hearing and that they lasted two or three hours. (Tr. 126) Mr. Fuller also testified
that from mid-August to Mid-September, Mayna had used over 2000 minutes talking to Mr.
Myers. (Tr. 128-29)

8

D.

Testimony of David Fuller

The Plaintiff David Fuller testified that he was at the courthouse on October 27,2005
and that as he entered the courtroom, Mr. Myers was seated, he approached him and told him
to stay off his property or Mr. Fuller would prosecute him for trespassing. Mr. Fuller
testified that the Defendant Mr. Myers raised both arms and told him it was not the time or
place. (Tr. 73-75) the Plaintiff testified that the Defendant Krik Myers was his neighbor and
that there had been a confrontation with the children of Mr. Myers in the summer of 2003,
prior to Mayna Fuller leaving her husband. Mr. Fuller testified that the children had broken
into his property. (Tr. 74, 77-78) Mr. Fuller testified that Mayna Fuller worked for him as
a secretary and he observed her leave the business and go to Mr. Myers' residence. He
testified that he observed her go to lunch with Mr. Myers and leave with him at night. (Tr.
79-80) Mr. Fuller also testified that Mr. Myers was at fourteen or fifteen court proceedings
involving the divorce, visitation or custody. (Tr. 82)
E.

Testimony of Mayna Fuller

Mayna Fuller was called as a witness by the Plaintiff. (Tr. 90) She testified that she
had no relationship with Mr. Myers at the time. In 2003, she testified that her relationship
with Mr. Myers was that of a neighbor and a friend. (Tr. 92). She testified that she only went
with him to get sprinkler supplies after he had a heart attack. (Tr. 93) Further, she testified
that Mr. Myers was married. Id.
As to the events of October 27,2005, she testified that she did not see or hear anything
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upon which a statement could be given. She testified that she did not give a statement to
anyone regarding the events of the day. (Tr. 96)
Mrs. Fuller testified that a couple of days after October 27, 2005, she went to police
complaining that she had been followed by a vehicle from where she picked the children up
from daycare until she got to almost to the police station and the police asked her to fill out
some paperwork. She described the vehicle as a green or blue older Ford Explorer that had
a bug shield on it. Mrs. Fuller denied giving the police any information as to who owned
such a vehicle. She testified, in response to questioning that she told the police her in-laws
owned a similar vehicle but also reported that she had friends with similar vehicles also. (Tr.
99-100)
Finally Mrs. Fuller testifies that Mr. Myers appeared at the court hearings as moral
support. (Tr. 101)
F.

Testimony of Ruth Fuller

Ruth Fuller, the wife of the Plaintiff testified that she was actually between Krik
Myers and the Plaintiff on October 27 and that she heard her husband, the Plaintiff, tell Mr.
Myers to stay off his property or he would prosecute. Otherwise, she testified that she did not
see any physical confrontation. (Tr. 108-9). She testified that she saw Mayna and Mr. Myers
leave together in a vehicle but never saw any showing of affection. (Tr. 110)
G.

Court's Ruling Dismissing the Case Against Mayna Fuller

Based upon the Defendant Mayna Fuller's motion, the trial court dismissed the action
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against her on the grounds that no charges were ever filed as a result of input from Mrs.
Fuller. (Tr. 118-19)
H.

Testimony of Dennis Sunday

Dennis Sunday, the father of Mayna Fuller was called to testify by the Plaintiff. Mr.
Sunday testified that Krik Myers did not attend all the divorce and related hearings. He
estimated that Mr. Myers attended three. Further, Mr. Sunday testified that he did not give
a statement to police regarding the incident of October 27. Instead, he prepared a statement
and gave it to Krik Myers. (Tr. 131-32)
I.

Testimony of Teresa Sunday

Teresa Sunday, the mother of Mayna Fuller was called to testify by the Plaintiff. Mrs.
Sunday testified that he did not give a statement to police regarding the incident of October
27. Instead, he prepared a statement and gave it to Krik Myers. (Tr. 134-35) Mrs. Sunday
testified that the confrontation between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, Krik Myers was a
verbal and physical confrontation with the Plaintiff, David Fuller, grabbing Mr. Myers' arm.
(Tr. 136)
J.

Testimony of Raylynn Sly

RayLynn Sly was called by the Plaintiff. She testified that she was Mayna Fuller's
aunt. She testified that she attended three court proceedings involving her niece. (Tr. 140-41)
She testified that on October 27, she saw the Plaintiff David Fuller dart towards the
Defendant Krik Myers. She testified that she saw the Plaintiff grab Mr. Myers' arm and was
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yelling at him-telling him to keep his children off his property or he would prosecute. She
testified that she heard Mr. Myers reply that it was not the time or place. (Tr. 140-43, 144)
K.

Judge Taylor's Ruling and Decision

After the close of the Plaintiffs case, the trial court made the following observations
and rulings:
1.

From a review of the criminal file, the court noted that an information
charging Mr. Fuller with disorderly conduct was filed on December 9,
2003. The same was served and required Mr. Fuller to appear in court
on January 2,2004. On January 26,2004, the Defendant entered a not
guilty plea. A pretrial conference was held on February 26, 2004 at
which the matter was set for trial on April 26, 2004. (Tr. 153-54)

2.

On April 22, 2004, the Provo City attorney filed a motion to dismiss
that stated: "comes now plaintiff by and through its counsel and in the
interest of justice requests dismissal of the above case." In the order
dismissing the case, it recited the dismissal was for "good cause
appearing." (Tr. 154)

3.

Counsel for Plaintiff acknowledged that the Plaintiff had put on no
evidence of damages and that there was no way that a damage award
could be rendered except by sheer speculation. (Tr. 164)

4.

Quoting section 653 of the Restatement, the trial court stated: "A
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private person who gives to a public official information of another's
supposed criminal conduct, of which the official is ignorant, obviously
causes the institution of subsequent proceedings as the official may
begin on their own initiative. . . But giving the information or even
making an accusation of criminal misconduct does not constitute a
procurement of the proceedings initiated by the officer if it is left
entirely to his discretion to initiate the proceedings or not. When a
private person gives to a prosecuting officer information that he
believed to be true, and the officer in the exercise of his uncontrolled
discretion initiates criminal proceedings based upon that information,
the informer is not liable under the rules stated in this section even
though the information proves to be false and his belief was one that a
reasonable man would not entertain. The exercise of the officer's
discretion makes the initiation of the prosecution his own, and protects
from liability the person whose information or acquisition has led the
officer to initiate proceedings. . . . In order to charge a private person
with the responsibility for the initiation of proceedings by a public
official it must therefore appear that his desire to have the proceedings
initiated expressed by direction, request or pressure of any kind, was
the determining factor in the official's decision to commence the

13

prosecution, or that the information furnished by him which the official
acted was known to be false. (Tr. 170-72)
5.

Counsel for the Plaintiff acknowledged that it was Deputy Banks who
testified that he gathered all the statements from both sides and that it
was he who made the recommendation to the Provo City prosecutor to
charge Mr. Fuller with disorderly conduct. (Tr. 167)

6.

Judge Taylor concluded that the only way that he could find for the
Plaintiff is if he engaged in complete speculation:
There's no evidence from which this court could possibly
conclude that these Defendants initiated charges. The charges
were disorderly conduct, they were filed by the Provo City
Attorney. (Tr. 176)

7.

Judge Taylor found that the criminal prosecution was not dismissed on
the merits but in the interests of justice. There was no evidence from
the Plaintiff as to the reason the prosecution was terminated and
certainly the city could re-file the charges. (Tr. 177) Further, the judge
found that there was absolutely no proof on damages. (Tr. 178)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The evidence and law will demonstrate that the right that the Plaintiff had to a jury
trial was specifically waived by the failure to file a demand for a jury and pay the jury fee as
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required by Rule 38 of the Utah Rules of Procedure. Further, the Plaintiff failed to
demonstrate in his subsequent filings regarding a jury, any legal basis upon which the trial
court should have acted to rescind its prior ruling denying the Plaintiffs request.
The lower court at no time conditioned the granting of a jury in this matter on the
condition that the Plaintiff retain counsel. The argument has no basis in the record of this
case.
The trial court acted properly in granting the Defendants' motion to dismiss on the
grounds that the Plaintiff had failed to make out a prima facie case of malicious prosecution.
The trial court correctly enunciated the elements of the cause of action and summarized
accurately the evidentiary record.
Judge Taylor adequately articulated the basis of granting the Defendants' motion to
dismiss in the record of this case and signed an appropriate order. The claim of the Appellant
that his loss of the jury was because of ineffective assistance of counsel, is a new argument,
made for the first time on appeal. Further, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not
generally accepted in these cases.
Finally, the Appellant has violated numerous rules of procedure in compiling the
Appellant's brief including the obligation to marshal the evidence and based upon the clear
violation of the rules, the brief should be stricken. In that regard, the arguments made by the
Appellant are not based in the record of this case and are not submitted in good faith and
accordingly, the Appellees should be awarded their costs and attorney fees on appeal.

15

ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE
38 IN DENYING THE PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR A JURY.
First, Appellees submit that any issues relating to Judge Taylor's ruling with regard
to the Plaintiffs right to a jury trial are moot because the trial court determined, as a matter
of law, that the Plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case of malicious prosecution.
Only if this Court were to determine that the trial court's findings on those issues were
clearly erroneous, would issues relating to a jury trial become relevant.
Second, the facts in this case are clear. As established by the court docket, the
Complaint was filed in this case on May 19, 2004. The only fee that was paid was the
regular filing fee for a civil complaint. No jury fee was tendered to the Clerk of the Court
at that time. Thus, the Plaintiff did make a demand for jury but did not pay the fee. A second
demand for jury was filed by the Plaintiff on October 11, 2005 (nearly seventeen months
after the filing of the Complaint) and, at that time, the Plaintiff paid the jury fee of $75.00.
®. 198) The trial court denied the motion for a jury in its ruling dated November 23, 2005.
®. 213) Without demonstrating any additional facts or circumstances, the Plaintiff filed a
renewed motion for a jury trial on June 20, 2005, which was fully briefed by the parties. ®.
221-27,223-34,235-32)
In his Ruling dated March 7, 2006, the court, in denying the motion, stated:
. . . A previous request for jury trial was denied by this Court as not having
been timely made. The Plainti ff demanded a jury trial when his complaint was
16

filed on May 19, 2005. The jury fee was paid to the Court on October 11,
2005. Rule 38, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, specifies that a demand for jury
trial must [be] accompanied by payment of the statutory jury fee and must
occur at the commencement of an action or within 10 days after "the service
of the last pleading directed to such issue." Failure to make a proper and
timely demand, accompanied by payment of the fee is a waiver of the right to
trial by jury. In this case the fee was not timely paid. The Plaintiff has made
no argument and submitted no information that was not available to the Court
when it previously considered this question. The motion is denied.
©.319-320)
The relevant provisions of Rule 38 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are clear:
a) Right preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by the constitution or
as given by statute shall be preserved to the parties.
(b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right
by a jury by paying the statutory jury fee and serving upon the other parties a
demand therefor in writing at any time after the commencement of the action
and not later than 10 days after the service of the last pleading directed to such
issue. Such demand may be endorsed upon a pleading of the party...
(d) Waiver. The failure of a party to pay the statutory fee, to serve a
demand as required by this rule and to file it as required by Rule 5(d)
constitutes a waiver by him of trial by jury. A demand for trial by jury
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made as herein provided may not be withdrawn without the consent of the
parties. (Emphasis added)
In Gasser v. Home, 557P.2d 154,156 (Utah 1976), the Court resolved a claim of the
appellant that it was denied a jury trial. The Court stated: "[w]e quickly dispose of that
argument because the [appellants] failed to comply with Rule 38(b). Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requires written demand be served upon the opposing party. Likewise, the
Court in Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P.2d 757 (Utah, 1985), held that a party wishing a jury, must
comply with the applicable statute or rule. Interpreting a prior version of Rule 38 that
required a demand for a jury to be filed ten days before trial, the Court stated:
The facts with respect to the brothers1 first claim are simple. They filed a
request for a jury eight days before the trial date. Rule 4.2 of the Rules of
Practice in the district courts of this state requires that such a request be
made ten days before trial. The trustees objected to the notice, and the law
and motion judge sustained the objection. The brothers argue that this
ruling denied them their constitutional right to a jury trial. Their
argument is without merit. The Utah Constitution, article I, section 10,
provides that in civil cases the right to a jury trial is "waived unless
demanded." To avail oneself of this right, one's demand must be timely
and in accordance with applicable rule or statute. Board of Education v.
West, 55 Utah 357, 362-63,186 P. 114,116 (1919). Nothing more was
required by the court below. (Emphasis added)
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Id. See also, Dyson v. Aviation Office of America, Inc., 593 P.2d 143 (Utah, 1979).
It is respectfully submitted that the Appellant did not meet the strict requirements of
Rule 38 by paying the jury fee and filing the demand and clearly, as allowed by the Utah
Constitution, the right to a jury trial is waived.
Importantly, the Appellant chose to simply file a new demand for jury and pay the fee
when he filed on October 11,2005. ®. 198) The Plaintiff did not make a motion to the Court
to exercise any discretion and did not place the basis for any motion in an affidavit. The
mere recital of unsubstantiated and unsupported facts in a new demand for a jury does not
call upon the court to exercise any discretion under any particular rule. The Plaintiff was
content to submit the issue to the trial court only on the renewed demand without motion,
memorandum or sworn statements. Once the trial court ruled on the issue, it was resolved
and became the law of the case.
The renewed motion for a jury, filed January 18,2006, ®. 227) constituted a motion
for reconsideration. It was filed out of the permissible time to be considered a Rule 59 or 60
motion filed in response to the trial court's ruling of November 23,2005. ®. 213). As noted
by the Court in Tschaggeny v. Milbanklns. Co., — P.3d —, 2007 WL 1225395 (Utah,2007),
We begin our analysis by establishing the proper standard of review. Motions
to reconsider are not recognized by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Gillett
v. Price, 2006 UT 24,ffif5,7-8,135 P.3d 861. Because trial courts are under
no obligation to consider motions for reconsideration, any decision to
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address or not to address the merits of such a motion is highly
discretionary. (Emphasis added)
Id.
Because the Plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 38 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, his right to a jury trial was waived in accordance with a specific provision of the
Utah Constitution. All that the trial court had to have to deny the jury trial to the Plaintiff
was the failure of the Plaintiff to timely file a demand and pay the statutory fee. The failure
to pay the fee is established by the court's docket. The Plaintiff provided no basis in its new
"demand" for the trial court to exercise any discretion. The Plaintiff failed to file any
affidavits, memoranda or formal motion addressing the issue. Once the trial court denied the
request, the subsequent "renewed" pleadings were motion to reconsider which the trial court
was not required even to address. However, as noted by Judge Taylor, the Plaintiff had
simply failed to offer any basis that would require a deviation from Rule 38.
POINT II: THE PLAINTIFF'S PRO SE STATUS DID NOT AFFECT
THE PLAINTIFF S RIGHT TO A JURY
The Plaintiff, in the preparation of the Appellant's brief, has violated almost every
rule relating to the requirements of a brief. The Appellant has failed to cite to the record of
the case, failed to separate established facts taken from the record or transcript of this case
from the Plaintiffs speculation and otherwise disregarded the Court's requirements for the
proper submission of a brief.
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In Point II of the Appellant's brief, the Appellant seems to be making the point that
apro se litigant may be granted a jury. At no time did Judge Taylor make a ruling that a pro
se Plaintiff could not have a jury. All of the Court's rulings were based upon the language
of Rule 38.
At the hearing held on October 3, 2005, Judge Taylor inquired of the Plaintiff if he
felt he was competent to try a case to a jury and asked him if he had seen a jury trial or
litigated a case. (October 3, 2005 Tr. at 37, 38) In response, Mr. Fuller indicated that he
would have counsel by trial and then Judge Taylor stated:
You did request a jury in the pleading but he [Mr. Hilton] never paid the filing
fee. The law generally is if that fee is not paid within 10 days of when the
complaint is filed the right to a jury trial is waived. .. . But I'll tell you what
I'll do. In the same time I've given them because they want to file some
motions, if you, if you want to look at the law and if you can convince me that
you're entitled to a jury under these circumstances-ITl certainly consider it and
then give then a chance to brief it as well.
/J. at 38, 39.
Of course, the allegation of the Appellant that the issue of him acting pro se was a
factor in denying the motion for a jury, is totally unsubstantiated by the Appellant from the
record. As clearly demonstrated above, Judge Taylor never made, as a part of his ruling, the
fact that the Plaintiff was acting pro se. Aside from the inquiries above, Judge Taylor ruled
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clearly and explicitly that Rule 38 was dispositive and that the Plaintiff had failed to supply
any facts or circumstances that would warrant the exercise of his discretion. Judge Taylor
ruled twice on the issue in writing and never was the representation of the Plaintiff
mentioned.
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN
MANAGING THE TRIAL.
Although included in Point 3 of the Appellant's brief discussing the legal
requirements of the cause of action plead in the Complaint, the Appellant makes the assertion
that judge Taylor committed error in allegedly shortening the trial from two days to one day
and thereby allegedly denying the Plaintiff the right to put on additional witnesses.
(Appellant's Brief at 19). Again, the Appellant is playing fast and loose with the facts of the
case.
The Plaintiff called all the witnesses it had and when the judge asked him to call any
additional witnesses, counsel for the Plaintiff indicated that he had a former bailiff, Mandy
Jensen under subpoena but that she was unavailable on March 27, the date of trial. Further,
counsel indicated that he had an Officer Arochis as a witness. (Tr. 146-147) Judge Taylor
responded that he has heard counsel's proffer as to Officer Arochis. Judge Taylor, with the
stipulation of defense counsel, was willing to have Mandy Jensen's report entered as an
exhibit, in lieu of her testimony. (Tr. 148-150) However, counsel for the Plaintiff refused the
offer. Judge Taylor then stated:
I'm not willing to continue this until tomorrow for one witness, counsel. It's
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2:00 in the afternoon, this is the time set for trial
Tr. 150.
Counsel for the Plaintiff then summarized Mandy Jensen's testimony. He indicated
that she would testify that she was in the courtroom and that she observed the actions of the
parties and would refute the Defendants' accounts. (Tr. 148, 150) Counsel for the Plaintiff
proffered that Mandy Jensen would testify that she was standing in close proximity to the
parties and that she saw no contact. Further, that when the parties started talking, she moved
in close to them. ®. 152) Judge Taylor then, with the Defendants' stipulation, accepted the
proffer of the testimony. (Tr. 152)
Accordingly, the Plaintiff was not denied the right to put any evidence before the trial
court. With all parties agreeing, the Plaintiff was allowed to proffer the testimony of the two
witnesses even though Judge Taylor could have prevented any further testimony based upon
the failure of the Plaintiffs to have their witnesses in court in the early afternoon of the first
day of trial.
Even more importantly, the court ruled that the details of the dispute between the
parties were not relevant to the Plaintiffs cause of action. The Defendants, the court ruled,
had a right to provide information to police officers. By so doing, the court ruled, the
Defendants did not initiate the criminal proceeding against the Plaintiff. Rather, the Provo
City prosecutor, acting on the recommendation of the deputy sheriff, initiated the proceeding.
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POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN RULING THAT THE
PLAINTIFF HAD FAILED TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

The Plaintiff was charged with Disorderly Conduct, in violation of U.C.A. 76-9102(l)(b) (1999 as Amended). The statute states as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if: (a) he refuses to comply with
the lawful order of the police to move from a public place, or knowingly
creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition, by any act which serves
no legitimate purpose; or (b) intending to cause public inconvenience,
annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: (I) engages
in fighting or in violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior; (ii) makes
unreasonable noises in a public place; (iii) makes unreasonable noises in a
private place which can be heard in a public place; or (iv) obstructs vehicular
or pedestrian traffic.
(2) "Public place," for the purpose of this section, means any place to which
the public or a substantial group of the public has access and includes but is
not limited to streets, highways, and the common areas of schools, hospitals,
apartment houses, office buildings, transport facilities, and shops.
The Defendant could have been charged with the crime with or without the physical
touching. If the prosecutor and officers believed that Mr. Fuller was acting in a threatening
manner, the charge would have been appropriate.
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The trial court ruled that the Plaintiff had not made out a prima facie case and found
as follows:
1.

From a review of the criminal file, the court noted that an information
charging Mr. Fuller with disorderly conduct was filed on December 9,
2003. The same was served and required Mr. Fuller to appear in court
on January 2,2004. On January 26, 2004, the Defendant entered a not
guilty plea. A pretrial conference was held on February 26, 2004 at
which the matter was set for trial on April 26, 2004. (Tr. 153-54)

2.

On April 22, 2004, the Provo City attorney filed a motion to dismiss
that stated: "comes now plaintiff by and through its counsel and in the
interest of justice requests dismissal of the above case." In the order
dismissing the case, it recited the dismissal was for "good cause
appearing." (Tr. 154)

3.

Counsel for Plaintiff acknowledged that the Plaintiff had put on no
evidence of damages and that there was no way that a damage award
could be rendered except by sheer speculation. (Tr. 164)

4.

Quoting section 653 of the Restatement, the trial court stated: "A
private person who gives to a public official information of another's
supposed criminal conduct, of which the official is ignorant, obviously
causes the institution of subsequent proceedings as the official may
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begin on their own initiative. . . But giving the information or even
making an accusation of criminal misconduct does not constitute a
procurement of the proceedings initiated by the officer if it is left
entirely to his discretion to initiate the proceedings or not. When a
private person gives to a prosecuting officer information that he
believed to be true, and the officer in the exercise of his uncontrolled
discretion initiates criminal proceedings based upon that information,
the informer is not liable under the rules stated in this section even
though the information proves to be false and his belief was one that a
reasonable man would not entertain. The exercise of the officer's
discretion makes the initiation of the prosecution his own, and protects
from liability the person whose information or acquisition has led the
officer to initiate proceedings. . . . In order to charge a private person
with the responsibility for the initiation of proceedings by a public
official it must therefore appear that his desire to have the proceedings
initiated expressed by direction, request or pressure of any kind, was
the determining factor in the official's decision to commence the
prosecution, or that the information furnished by him which the official
acted was known to be false. (Tr. 170-72)
5.

Counsel for the Plaintiff acknowledged that it was Deputy Banks who
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testified that he gathered all the statements from both sides and that it
was he who made the recommendation to the Provo City prosecutor to
charge Mr. Fuller with disorderly conduct. (Tr. 167)
6.

Judge Taylor concluded that the only way that he could find for the
Plaintiff is if he engaged in complete speculation:
There's no evidence from which this court could possibly
conclude that these Defendants initiated charges. The charges
were disorderly conduct, they were filed by the Provo City
Attorney. (Tr. 176)

7.

Judge Taylor found that the criminal prosecution was not dismissed on
the merits but in the interests of justice. There was no evidence from
the Plaintiff as to the reason the prosecution was terminated and
certainly the city could re-file the charges. (Tr. 177) Further, the judge
found that there was absolutely no proof on damages. (Tr. 178)

It is respectfully submitted that Judge Taylor accurately summarized Utah law. A
plaintiff must first establish that the defendant instituted or continued a criminal proceeding
against the plaintiff in order to successfully maintain a claim for malicious prosecution. Cline
v. Div. of Child and Family Services, 142 P.3d 127 (Utah App. 2005) (holding where absence
of welfare worker or DCFS having instituted a criminal proceeding against father, he could
not maintain a claim against welfare worker or DCFS). "In order to successfully maintain a
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claim for malicious prosecution, a party must establish four elements..,rArnica Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 959 (Utah Ct.App.1989).
"(1) A criminal proceeding i nstituted or continued by the defendant against the
plaintiff; (2) termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused; (3) absence
of probable cause for the proceeding; [and] (4) 'malice/ or a primary purpose
other than that of bringing an offender to justice." Callioux v. Progressive Ins.
Co., 745 P.2d 838, 843 (Utah Ct.App.1987) (citing W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Law
of Torts § 119 (5th ed. 1984)). The failure to establish any one of the four
elements is fatal to the cause of action. Id.
Id.
The Court has established that to prove that a defendant instituted the criminal
proceeding, a plaintiff must show that the defendant was "actively instrumental in putting the
law in force." Callioux, 745 P.2d at 843 (quoting Rose v. Whitbeck, 277 Or. 791, 562 P.2d
188, 190 (1977)). In Arnica, the fact that the defendants were actively sending the police
agencies letters encouraging further action did not detract from the simple conclusion that
the decision to file criminal charges was that of the prosecutor.
As announced by the Court in Gilbert v. Ince, 981 P.2d 841, 845 (Utah 1999), Utah
has adopted the standards of Restatement (Second) of Torts, sections 653-673 to govern
malicious prosecution cases. Under that standard, a person who does not initiate proceedings
himself may procure the institution of criminal proceedings by inducing a third party to
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initiate them. Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 653, comment d (1977). Giving "to a
third person, whether public official or private party, information of another's supposed
criminal conduct or even accusing] the other person of a crime. . . does not constitute a
procurement of the proceedings that the third person initiates if it is left to the uncontrolled
choice of the third party person to bring the proceeding or not as he may see fit." Id.
The prosecutor and not the Defendants in this case initiated criminal proceedings
against the Plaintiff. The Defendants simply provided written statements. It was the deputy
sheriff who acknowledged getting statements from both sides and then sending the packet
to the Provo City prosecutor with a recommendation that the Plaintiff be charged with
disorderly conduct. Illustration 2 of Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 653 contains a
very similar fact pattern to the case at hand:
A goes to B, a district attorney, and informs him that C has committed a
battery upon A. A believes his statement to be true. The district attorney asks
him whether he wishes C to be prosecuted. A says, "I leave that entirely to
you." The district attorney files an information against C. A has not procured
the institution of the proceedings.
Id. at section 653, illustration 2.
In this case, the Defendants were not even asked by law enforcement or the
prosecutors whether they wanted the Plaintiff charged. Everything having to do with the
prosecution, after the submission of the statements, was at the sole discretion of the deputy
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sheriff and the Provo City prosecutor.
In reviewing the four requirements of a malicious prima facie case, it is submitted that
Judge Taylor ruled correctly that the Plaintiffs had failed to establish a case. The Plaintiff
failed to prove that the criminal proceeding was instituted or continued by the Defendants
against the Plaintiff. Although the Plaintiff proved that the action had been dismissed, the
Plaintiff did not prove that the proceedings had been terminated in favor of the Plaintiff. The
case was dismissed in the interests ofjustice and the Plaintiff failed to call anyone from the
Provo City Attorney's office to testify that the dismissal was one on the merits of the case.
The Plaintiff did no prove a lack of probable cause. As noted by Judge Taylor, the
threatening behavior of the Plaintiff, absent physical contact, would be sufficient under the
statute to find probable cause. Lastly, there was an absence of malice but even if the Plaintiff
could prevail on the malice issue, the cause of action still fails because the absence of any
element is fatal to the claim.
POINT V: THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE FAILS BASED
UPON THE LACK OF DAMAGES
As set out in the Statement of Facts, there is no question that the Plaintiff failed to put
on any evidence of damages. As noted by Judge Taylor, it would require pure speculation
to imply that the Plaintiff had suffered any damage. The Plaintiff did not put on any proof
of monetary loss or even testimony of non-economic injury such as loss of reputation, etc.
There is simply nothing in the record that the Plaintiff could point to that resembles evidence
of damage.
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The law is clear. Malicious prosecution is a tort. A plaintiff, to recover for the
commission of a tort, must demonstrate (1) the standard of care by which the person's
conduct is to be measured, (2) proof of a breach of that standard by the tortfeasor, (3) injury
that was proximately caused by the tortious conduct, and (4) damages. Jensen v. IHCHosps.,
Inc., 82 P.3d 1076 (Utah 2003) (quotations and citations omitted). "A plaintiffs failure to
present evidence that, if believed by the trier of fact, would establish any one of the
[elements] of the prima facie case justifies a grant of summary judgment to the defendant."
Kent v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 930 P.2d 904,906 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (alteration in original)
(quotations and citation omitted). See also, Sohm v. Dixie Eye Center, -P3d —, 2007 WL
2084144 (Utah App. 2007).
The Court in Tuttle v. Olds, 155 P.3d 893 (Utah App.2007) stated the test as follows:
To state a claim for negligence, Plaintiffs must establish four elements: " '(1)
that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, (2) that the defendant breached
that duty, (3) that the breach of duty was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs
injury, and (4) that the plaintiff in fact suffered injuries or damages.' " Webb v.
University of Utah, 125 P.3d 906 (Utah 2005) (quoting Hunsaker v. State, 870
P.2d 893, 897 (Utah 1993)).
Id.
Regardless of the tort, whether it be assault, battery, negligence, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, abuse ofprocess, malicious prosecution, slander, libel or any other tort,
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the claimant or plaintiff must establish injury that is proximately caused by the tortious
conduct and must establish damages. The absolute failure of the Plaintiff to establish even
a hint of damages is fatal to the claim.
POINT VI: PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE
ENTRY OF DEFAULT AGAINST DEFENDANT MYERS
Plaintiff argues that he was entitled to take the default judgment of the Defendant
Myers because his Answer was unsigned and he did not appear for trial. (Appellant's Brief
at 23). Again, the Plaintiff fails to get his facts right. The Answer of Mr. Myers is in fact
signed and filed with the court. ®. 22-23). Further, the Defendant Krik Myers, after filing
a pro se answer to the Complaint, was represented by counsel throughout the proceeding. ®.
42) The Defendant Myers has appeared and done all that was required of him including
responding to burdensome discovery requests of the Plaintiff. The fact that the Defendant
was not at trial is simply not a basis to enter a default.
The argument of the Plaintiff, in its entirety mis-states the record and is baseless
POINT VII: ANY CLAIM BASED UPON THE INEFFECTIVENESS
OF COUNSEL IN FAILING TO PAY THE JURY FEE WAS
NOT RAISED IN THE TRIAL COURT AND IS BASELESS
There is no question that the Plaintiff knew, before trial that his former counsel, Mr.
Hilton, had allegedly failed to file the jury fee with the demand in the Complaint. In fact, Mr.
Hilton was called by the Plaintiff in the case and was not asked a single question regarding
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the failure to pay the jury fee. Further, the apparent mistake of the Plaintiffs former counsel
was known well in advance of the renewed motion to allow a jury filed by the Plaintiff. ®.
227) However, the Plaintiff did not raise the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in its
motion, memorandum or reply memorandum. Generally, appellate courts will not review
issues raised for the first time on appeal, unless the trial court committed plain error. See In
re E .R., 21 P.3d 680 (Utah App. 2001). To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must first
raise the issue before the trial court and give the trial court the opportunity to rule on the
matter. SeeHartv. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125,129 (Utah Ct .App. 1997). The
Plaintiff has not and could not make out a claim of plain error and it is respectfully submitted
that this Court should rule that the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was waived by
the failure to preserve the issue.
Secondly, as noted by the Court in Marchand v. Marchand, 147 P.3d 538 (Utah
App.,2006), the general rule is that in civil cases a new trial will not be granted based upon
the incompetence or negligence of onefs own trial counsel. There are cases which recognize
that under exigent or exceptional circumstances which appear to have resulted in an injustice,
the court may be justified in granting a new trial. Jennings v. Stoker, 652 P.2d 912,913 (Utah
1982). Based upon the clear mandate of Rule 38, this is certainly not the case to extend
ineffective assistance of counsel cases into matters as trivial as failing to pay a jury fee.
POINT VIII: JUDGE TAYLOR MADE SUFFICIENT FACTUAL FINDINGS
Judge Taylor's extensive oral rulings have been set forth in the Statement of Facts and
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in the argument of this case. Judge Taylor's methodical analysis of each of the issues in this
case has been set out from the trial transcript. The Utah appellate courts will uphold a trial
court's directed verdict or motion to dismiss, when the case is tried to the court, if
"reasonable minds would agree that no substantial evidence supported each element of the
cause of action." Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 57 (Utah 1991).
As noted inD. J.. Investment Group, L.L.C. v. Dae/Westbrook, L.L.C, 147 P.3d 414
(Utah 2006), where written findings are required, "[a] trial court need not resolve every
conflicting evidentiary issue.... Rather, the trial court's factual findings must be articulated
with sufficient detail so that the basis of the ultimate conclusion can be understood.
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 886 P.2d 514, 521 (Utah
1994) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Certainly,
Judge Taylor's detailed analysis and findings more than meet the test.
POINT IX: THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE
There is no question in this matter that the Appellant/Plaintiff is in fact challenging
the findings of the trial court. Accordingly, in order to present the argument challenging the
lower court's findings and holdings, the party "must marshall [sic] all of the evidence
supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light of the
conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence."
Grace Drilling Co. v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Comm 'n, 116 P.2d 63,68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989);
accord Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all
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record evidence that supports the challenged finding."). The marshaling requirement applies
when a party challenges a court's or an agency's factual findings, regardless of the standard
of review at issue. See, e.g., Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 54 P.3d 1177 (Utah
2002) (holding that to correctly dispute the lower court's factual findings as clearly
erroneous, "an appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then
demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing
it in a light most favorable to the court below"); United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting
Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 140 P.3d 1200 (Utah 2006) ("[P]arties who ask this court to
consider fact-sensitive questions-including those questions reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard-have a duty to marshal all the evidence that formed the basis for the trial
court's ruling."). The marshaling requirement requires a party to construct the evidence
supporting the adversary's position, and then "ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence." West
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah 1991). Compliance with this
undertaking helps ensure that the factual findings of the agency are overturned only when
lacking in substantial evidence.
Appellees understand that the marshaling requirement is not a rule of substantive law
but rather it is a tool pursuant to which the appellate courts impose on the parties an
obligation to assist them in conducting a whole record review. However, parties that fail to
marshal the evidence do so at the risk that the reviewing court will decline, in its discretion,
to review the trial court's factual findings. See Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004)
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(explaining that the marshaling requirement is critical because in its absence the appellate
court "must go behind the trial court's factual findings," which often requires a "colossal
commitment of time and resources"). Utah R.App. P. 24(b)(k) ("Briefs which are not in
compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court ...."
(emphasis added)).
It is submitted that the Plaintiff has failed to comply with many of the rules relating
to the presentation on appeal. The Appellant has failed to cite to the record on most
occasions and has taken unfair liberties with the transcript and record in this case. It is
respectfully submitted that if ever there was a case in which to hold the Appellant to the
regular rules of appellate procedure, it is this one. The Appellant has subjected the
Defendants to onerous discovery and a trial. Now on appeal, the Appellant argues issues that
have no merit or foundation in the record. If the Appellant had marshaled the evidence, as
required by this Court, the absurdity of many of the arguments would have been apparent.
The Appellees respectfully request that the Court determine that the Appellant has failed in
his obligation and thereby deny his appeal on issues related to the facts in this case.
POINT X: APPELLEES SHOULD BE AWARDED THEIR COSTS
AND ATTORNEY FEES IN THIS MATTER.
Under Rule 33(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a frivolous appeal " . . .
is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith
argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law."' This Court has stated that "when an
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appeal is frivolous,... we will award fees regardless of the trial court's ruling on fzzs"Burt
v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah Ct.App.1990). However, "[t]he sanction for filing a
frivolous appeal applies only in 'egregious cases' with no 'reasonable legal or factual basis.'
" Cooke v. Cooke, 22 P.3d 1249 (Utah App. 2001) (citation omitted).
It is respectfully submitted that as to each issue, from the failure of the trial court to
allow a jury, to arguing that the trial court denied a jury based upon the pro se nature of the
Plaintiffs representation, to the elements of malicious prosecution and the findings of the
trial court, through the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and lack of findings, the
Appellant has fundamental flaws with each claim that meet the standard of being egregious,
without a reasonable factual or legal basis.
Accordingly, Appellees request attorney fees and costs incident to the appeal.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court acted properly in all regards and that the
judgment of dismissal of the Plaintiffs action be affirmed and that the Appellees be awarded
their costs and fees on appeal.
Dated this

day of August, 2007.
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Matthew P. Jube, Esq.
Attomeyjer-Appdi^

semondfG. Blakelock, Esq.
Attorney for Appellees/Defendants
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Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
__, l2|)3l0Co

Q» Deputy

DAVID FULLER Pro Se.
2025 Canyon Rd
Springville Utah 84663
(801) 489-8145
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PROVO DEPARTMENT, COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID FULLER
Plaintiff,
ORDER

vs.
KRIK MYERS etaL

Case No. 040401694 MI
Defendant.
JUDGE: JAMES R. TAYLOR

This case was heard before the court on the 27th March 2006 for a bench trial and the case was
dismissed based on the findings that there exists QO cause of action'
oitc pHvate^wt'stJii'-tigaiu&l another.
ORDER
Based on the findings, the case is ordered dismissed with prejudice. Parties will pay their own
costs of litigation.
SO ORDERED
this 13

^

~ZS&JL2l»r.,

day o/December, 2006 -

BY THE COUR'

agree as to form.
Rose Blakelock

Matthew Juoe
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